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Abstract 
 In this study we propose an axiomatic theory of decision-making under risk that is based 
on a new approach to the modeling of framing that focuses on the subjective statistical 
dependence between prizes of compared lotteries. Unlike existing models that allow 
objective statistical dependence, as in Regret Theory, in our model the emphasis is on 
alternative subjective statistical dependence patterns that are induced by alternative 
descriptions of the lotteries, i.e., by alternative framing. A distinct advantage of the 
proposed general descriptive model of choice is its ability to adequately explain a wide 
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 Introduction 
The Expected Utility Model is widely accepted in the field of decision-making under risk. 
Its appeal is due to two advantages: it is based on logical and simple axioms and it yields 
powerful results. Nevertheless, descriptively this model is misleading and, at the least 
questionable, in light of the empirical data that reveal systematic violation of its 
underlying assumptions (Starmer, 2000). The following are a number of examples: 
 
• “Allais Paradox”, Allais (1953) 
• “The Two-Phase Lottery Paradox”, Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
• “The Common Ratio Paradox”, Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
• “The Duplex Gamble Paradox”,  Slovic & Lichtenstein (1968), Payne & 
Braunstein (1971) 
•  “Non-Transitive Preferences”, Tversky (1969), Fishburn (1970)  
•  “Preference Reversal”, Grether & Plott (1979), Loomes et. al. (1991)  
•  “Violations of Stochastic Dominance”, Tversky & Kahneman (1981, 1986) 
   
Many models have been proposed to resolve the above paradoxes, usually by 
weakening, dispensing of, or replacing one or more of the original axioms. Most of these 
models are consistent with the Allais Paradox, some with Non-Transitive Preferences (for 
example, Fishburn’s (1982) SSB model), and some with the Violations of Stochastic 
Dominance (the “Prospect Theory” of Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The objective of this 
paper is to join the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk by proposing a new 
axiomatic approach to the modeling of framing that resolves all the above paradoxes. A 
comprehensive discussion on the relationship between our approach  and the existing 
models is left to the summary section.  
The proposed model is based on several basic principles. First, the mode of 
presentation of a lottery is assumed to be an essential and inseparable part of it.  For 
example, consider an individual who has to make two decisions between lotteries p and q 
and between lotteries p’ and q’. The four lotteries are presented below: 
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                                                     p                                                       p'   
                          0.8                0.2                                         0.75                0.25  
                                                    0.2    a      0.8   
                            0                                      4,000                   0                    0                 4,000 
                     q         q'  
       0.75    0.25            0.75              0.25 
       0    a     1 
     0              3,000            0       0           3,000  
Notice that while p (q) is a simple lottery, p’ (q’) is a complex two-stage lottery (‘a’ 
denoting the lottery’s second stage). Although both lotteries share the same underlying 
distribution, that is, they give 4,000 with 20% probability (3,000 with 25% probability), 
they are considered in the proposed model to be two different lotteries.  
Second, the means of modeling framing is the individual’s perception of the 
dependence between the lotteries s/he confronts. Specifically, an individual facing a 
choice between two lotteries is assumed to form subjective statistical dependence 
between them according to their description and his or her subjective perception. Unlike 
subjective distortion of prizes or of probability of prizes, such formation of subjective 
statistical dependence between different lotteries' prizes has remained uncharted territory 
in the field of decision-making under risk. In the proposed model the subjective statistical 
dependence is represented by a matrix with rows and columns corresponding to prizes 
and entries that specify the joint probability of receiving the ‘row’ prize from the first 
lottery and the ‘column’ prize from the second lottery.  
For example, if individuals perceive the above p and q as statistically independent, 
the matrix representing these lotteries is m(p,q). However, if they assume that they 
proceed to stage ‘a’ in p’ iff they proceed to stage ‘a’ in q’, then the matrix representing 
these lotteries is m(p’,q’). These two matrices are: 
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  m(p,q)      m(p',q')   
q  q'    
0  3000  4000  
 
0  3000  4000  
  0   60%  20%      0   75%  5%   
p   3000       p'   3000      
  4000   15%  5%     
 
  4000    20%   
           
Third, subjective statistical dependence is assumed to play an essential role in 
individual decision-making. The individual’s preference relation over lotteries ≿  is 
derived from basic preferences over matrices representing statistical dependence between 
the lotteries. Specifically, imposing several axioms on the basic preferences, it is shown 
that the individual’s choice is based on the expected value corresponding to the 




xy ) y x, ( m Φ  ≥ 0. 
where  m is the matrix describing the subjective statistical dependence between the 
lotteries;   is the joint probability of receiving ‘x’ in the first lottery and ‘y’ in the 
second lottery, and Φ  is a real-valued function representing the individual’s preference 
for receiving ‘x’ instead of ‘y’.  
xy m
The model is presented in section 1. Section 2 contains the main representation 
result. We then illustrate in Section 3 how the model is consistent with the above-
mentioned paradoxes. Section 4 concludes with a summary and discussion. 
 
1. The Model 
Let X  be a finite set of prizes X={x1,x2, ....,xn }, n≥2 and P the set of possible lotteries on 
X. An individual is defined by the pair < M,  >, where M (M :PxP→M) is a function 
that assigns a single matrix from the matrix space M to every ordered pair of lotteries and 
≿* is a binary relation on M.  
* ;
   3A typical matrix m describes the statistical dependence between the two lotteries 
according to the individual's subjective perception. Given two lotteries p,q∈P, the matrix 
m(p,q) assigned by the function M is referred to as the Subjective Statistical Dependence 
Matrix (SSDM) between p and q. This matrix has the following properties: 
• it is of the order nxn (n being the number of prizes in X); 
•   is the probability of receiving prize x in p and prize y in q;  q) (p, mxy
•  ∈[0,1], ∀  x,y ∈ X;  q) (p, mxy
•  =1;  ∑
XxX
xy q) (p, m
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Note that in our setting one explicit characteristic of a lottery is the probabilities 
corresponding to the possible prizes. The remaining characteristics that are associated 
with framing are not explicitly defined. However, their impact is represented by the 
SSDM. In the special case of a certain lottery, these remaining framing characteristics 
do not affect the SSDM. In other words, when one of the lotteries is degenerate, the 
individual's decision-making is not affected by framing.
1
≿* is a basic binary preference relation on M, which is assumed to be complete, 
transitive and reflexive, with the symmetric and asymmetric parts ~* and ≻*.   
≿* has the following interpretation: for p,q,r,w∈P,  m(p,q)  ≿*  m(r,w) means that 
receiving p instead of q is “preferred to” or “equivalent to” receiving r instead of w. 
For example, let p,q,r,w  be the following certain lotteries (prizes): 
 p = (50,100%),  q = (10,100%), r = (1001,100%) and w = (1000,100%). That is, p is a 
lottery giving a prize 50 with probability 1, q gives 10 with probability 1, r gives 1001 
                                                 
1 Our particular modeling of framing rules out this possibility, although, in general, even if lotteries are 
degenerate, the individual's decision-making may be affected by framing.    
 
   4with probability 1, and w gives the prize 1000 with probability 1. If m(p,q) ≿* m(r,w), 
the individual values receiving 50 (instead of 10) more than receiving 1001 (instead of 
1000). 
Let ≿ denote the individual’s binary preference relation on P. ≿ is induced from 
the basic binary relation ≿* by assuming that p≿ q  iff  m(p,q) ≿* m(q,p). This definition 
implies that the preference relation ≿ is affected by the statistical dependence between 
the two lotteries. Note that although ≿* is assumed to be transitive, the binary relation ≿ 
is not necessarily transitive. 
2
Given  m’,m∈M and α∈[0,1], the matrix [αm’+(1-  α)m] denotes the α - linear 
combination of m and m’. For example, let p,q,r∈P, and p=(10,100%), q=(20,100%) and 
r=(30,100%) be certain lotteries (prizes). In this case the matrices m(p,q) and m(r,r) are 
(if one or two of the lotteries are certain lotteries, the corresponding Subjective Statistical 
Dependence Matrix is unique): 
 
m(p,q)  m(r,r)  
q  r  
 
10  20  30  
 
10  20  30  
  10    1      10      
p   20       r    20      
  30      
 
  30      1  
 
Now, let p’=(10,50%; 30,50%), q’=(20,50%; 30,50%). The subjective statistical 
dependence between p’ and q’ can be represented by various matrices and, in particular, 
by the matrices m* and m**: 
 
 
                                                 
2 For example, let X={a,b,c}. Since X is finite and ≿* transitive, ≿* can be represented by a real-value 
function denoted as Φ. Suppose now that Φ(m(a,b))= Φ(m(b,c))= Φ(m(c,a))>0; that is, by definition, the 
individual prefers a over b, b over c and c over a, so ≿ is not transitive. 
 
   5m*   m**    
10  20  30  
 
10  20  30  
  10    50%      10    25%  25%  
  20        20      
  30      50%  
 
  30    25%  25%  
 
Note that the matrix m* is a linear combination of m(p,q) and m(r,r). Thus, this matrix 
merges the lotteries while preserving the exact statistical dependence between p and q 
and between r and r, that is, the individual assumes s/he will get 10 in lottery p’ iff s/he 
receives 20 in lottery q’. It is easy to verify that m** is not a linear combination of m(p,q) 
and m(r,r).  
           
2. The Representation Result 
The individual preferences are assumed to satisfy the following axioms:  
 
Axiom C (Continuity) 
Let m,m’,m”∈M, such that m ≿* m’ ≿* m”. Then there exists α∈[0,1] such that: 
m’ ∼* α m + (1- α) m”. 
 
That is, if m is preferred or equivalent to m’ and m’ is preferred or equivalent to m”, there 
is some linear combination of m and m” that is equivalent to m’. 
 
Axiom I (Independence)  
Suppose that the matrix m ~  relates to two equivalent lotteries. Then for every m∈M and 
α∈ [0,1], 
m ~ m ∼* α m+(1- α)    .
 
That is, if the statistical dependence matrix between equivalent lotteries, say r and w, is 
merged to the matrix describing the dependence between any two lotteries, say p and q, 
while preserving complete statistical dependence (preserving the exact statistical 
   6dependence between p and q as well as between r and w), then the original preference 
relation between p and q is identical to the relation between the lotteries of the combined 
matrix  α m+(1- α) m ~ . Note that in the standard expected utility model, VNM (1944), it 
is assumed that, for every p,q,r,w∈P, such that r∼w,  p≿q⇔ [αp+(1-α)r] ≿ [ αq+(1-
α)w], where α∈[0,1] represents the probability assigned to the lottery p. Let I
s denote this 
standard independence axiom. In our model, the independence axiom I requires complete 
statistical dependence between the two relevant parts of the lotteries. This more 
demanding requirement means that one lottery materializes in probability α iff the other 
lottery materializes in the same probability. In other words, in the proposed model, 
independence requires that the matrix m([αp+(1-α)r],[  αq+(1-α)w]) be a linear 
combination of  m(p,q) and m(r,w). 
 
Axiom S (Symmetry) 
For every p,q,r,w∈P,  m(p,q) ≿* m(r,w).⇔ m(q,p) ≾* m(w,r). 
 
That is, if getting p instead of q is preferred or equal to receiving r instead of w, then 
getting w instead of r is preferred or equal to receiving q instead of p. 
In particular, since there are lotteries  q , p ∈P, such that m( q , p ) ≿* m(p,q) for every 
p,q∈P, axiom S implies that m(q,p) ≿* m( p , q ) for every p,q∈P. That is, if getting  p  
instead of q is perceived by the individual as the best result, then getting q instead of  p  
is perceived by the individual as the worst result.  
Let x denote any certain lottery that gives prize x with certainty.
3
 
Axiom D (Dominance) 
For every p,q∈P, if for every x,y∈P,   ≥  ⇔   x ≿ y,  then p ≿ q.  q) (p, mxy q) (p, myx
 
                                                 
3 Since, as already noted, there is a single SSDM corresponding to any such x and y, the same relationship 
≿* holds between them.     
   7That is, if whenever x is preferred or equal to y, the probability of getting x in p and y in q 
is greater than the probability of getting y in p and x in q, then p is preferred or equal to q. 
For example, assume that for the two lotteries p,q,  m(p,q) is:  
 
q     
10  20  30  
  10    10%   
p   20   70%  20%   
  30      
 
 
In this case, by axiom D, if 20 ≿ 10, then p ≿ q. 
 
Proposition 1: If ≿* is a binary relation on M that satisfies axioms I, C, S and D, then 
there is a real valued function Φ :M→ℝ, such that for every p,q∈P, 
p≿q ⇔∑
X * X
xy ) y x, ( m Φ ≥ 0. 
Proof: Let p and q be any two lotteries in P. The matrix m(p,q) has k∈[0,..,n(n-1)/2] 
entries  , such that x ≻ y .  q) (p, mxy
If k > 0, let us take some entry  for which x ≻ y.  q) (p, mxy
Let  x and  x be certain lotteries  (prizes) such that  ) x , x m( ≿* m(x,y) for every certain 
lottery x,y∈P. The existence of such x and  x is secured since X is finite and ≿* is 
transitive. By axiom C, there exists a number Φ = Φ(x,y), such that 
m(x,y) ∼*  Φ ) x , x m( +(1-Φ) m(x,x)  
(which implies that Φ(x,x)= 0 and Φ ) x , x ( = 1). 
Let m’ be a matrix that differs from m(p,q) only in the entry  =0.  xy m
By axiom I, the basic preference relation is unaffected if m(x,y) is replaced with  
Φ ) x , x ( m +(1-Φ) m(x,x): 
   8m= [m(x,y)]  + (1- )[m’/(1- )] ~*   xy m xy m xy m
xy m [ Φ(x,y)  ) x , x ( m + (1- Φ(x,y)) m(x,x)]  + (1-  )[m’/(1-  )] = m1.  xy m xy m
 
Now, a different entry in the matrix m1, for which x ≻ y, can be chosen and replaced in 
the same way, thereby creating the matrix m2. After k such replacements, in the resulting 
matrix mk , which is equivalent to m, i.e., mk ~* m, all the entries   such that   ) q , p ( mxy
x ≻ y are equal to 0, except the entry 
x x m , which is given by 
x x m =∑
X * X
xy ) y x, ( m Φ  | x ≻ y.  
In a similar manner we can transform all the entries   for which x  ≺  y. 
Specifically, let 
) q , p ( mxy
' x , ' x  be certain lotteries (prizes) such that m(x,y) ≿*  ) ' x , ' x ( m  for all 
certain lotteries x,y∈P. The existence of  ' x  and  ' x  is secured since X is finite and ≿* is 
transitive. By axiom C, there is a number Φ = Φ(x,y), such that  
m(x,y) ∼* Φ  ) ' x , ' x ( m +(1-Φ)m(x,x). 
There are j∈[0,..,n(n-1)/2] entries   in the matrix mk  for which x ≺ y.  q) (p, mxy
If j > 0, let us take some entry   for which x ≺ y.  q) (p, mxy
This entry may be replaced with 0 in the same manner as entries in the matrix for which  
x ≻ y were transformed to 0, until we obtain the matrix mk+j in which all the entries such 
that x ≺ y or x ≻ y are equal to 0 except 
x x m  and 
' x ' x m  where  
x x m =  | x ≻ y   and   ∑
X * X
xy ) y x, ( m Φ
' x ' x m =∑
X * X
xy ) y x, ( m Φ  | x ≺ y. 
By axiom S, for every x,y,   ) x , x ( m ≿* m(x,y) ⇔ m(x,y) ≿*  ) x , x ( m , thus 
 (x,x)=( ' x , ' x ). By axiom D, for every p,q∈P, 
p≿q ⇔∑
X * X
xy ) y x, ( m Φ ≥ 0.              ■ 
 
   9Since the real-valued function Φ(x,y) can be interpreted as representing the individual’s 
preference for receiving ‘x’ instead of ‘y’, we say that the choice between two lotteries p 
and q is based on the expected value corresponding to their interchange. The function 
Φ(x,y) is referred to as the value function of prize-differences or, in short, the value 
function.   
 
3. Resolution of the Paradoxes 
In this section the proposed model is shown to be consistent with the aforementioned 
paradoxes.  
 
The Allais Paradox 
Suppose that the individual chooses between lotteries p and q and between lotteries 
p' and q' given below: 
 
Lottery Probability 
  90%         9%        1% 
p 
q 
1m            1m         1m
1m            5m         0 
p' 
q’ 
0               1m         1m
0               5m         0 
 
Most individuals prefer p to q and q' to p', violating the standard independence axiom I
s, 
Allais (1953). If one of the lotteries is a certain lottery (prize), then there is a unique 
Subjective Statistical Dependence Matrix, m(p,q): 
 
  m(p,q)     
q     
0  1m  5m  
  0      
p   1m   1%  90%  9%  
  5m      
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However, there are various matrices that can represent the subjective statistical 
dependence between p’ and q’ and, in particular, the following matrices m* and m**:  
 
 
  m*      m**  
q'  q'    
0  1m  5m  
 
0  1m  5m  
  0   90%        0   81.9%  8.1%  
p'   1m   1%    9%   p'   1m   9.1%    0.9%  
  5m      
 
  5m      
 
If the individual's subjective perceptions regarding the interdependence between p’ and q' 
are given by m*, then in our model, p ≻ q  iff  p’ ≻ q’. 
This is due to the fact that m(p,q) and m*(p’,q’) have, respectively, the following  
0.9-linear combination representations: 
 
  0  1m  5m     0  1m  5m  
  0         0      
0.9   1m    100%   0.1   1m   10%    90%  




  5m      
 
and 
  0  1m  5m     0  1m  5m  
  0   100%      0      
0.9   1m       0.1   1m   10%    90%  




  5m      
 
Therefore, by axiom I,  p  ≻  q  iff  p’  ≻  q’. However, if the individual’s subjective 
perceptions regarding the interdependence between p’ and q' are given by m**(p',q'),  p 
   11≻ q    does not imply p’ ≻ q’. In other words, the value function Φ(x,y) may be such that 
≥ 0 and  < 0, that is, the individual prefers p 
to q and q’ to p’. More specifically, given m(p,q),  
∑
X * X
xy ) y x, ( ) q , p ( m Φ ∑
X * X
xy ) y x, ( ) ' q , ' p ( m Φ
p ≻ q ⇔ 0.01Φ(1m, 0) + 0.9Φ(1m,1m) + 0.09Φ(1m, 5m) > 0. 
However, if the individual perceives the statistical dependence between p’ and q’ as in   
m**(p',q'),  then  
p’ ≺ q’ ⇔ 0.091Φ(1m, 0) + 0.819Φ(0, 0) + 0.009Φ(1m, 5m) + 0.081Φ(0, 5m) < 0. 
It is easy to verify that there are values of Φ such that these inequalities hold. For 
example, if Φ(1m, 0) = 100, Φ(1m, 1m) = Φ(0, 0)=0, Φ(1m, 5m) = -10, Φ(0, 5m) = -200, 
then p ≻ q ( 0.1 > 0) and  p’ ≺ q’ (-7.19 < 0). 
  
Moskowitz (1974) and Keller (1985) found that the way that problems like those 
resulting in the Allais paradox, are described; significantly affects the proportion of 
subjects making decisions in conformation with or in violation of the standard 
independence axiom. Different choices are possible if the problems are described in the 
standard matrix form (as above), in a decision-tree form, or in a form of minimally 
structured written statements. Such findings cannot be explained by most models of 
decision-making under risk. The proposed model assumes that different representations 
of lotteries differently affect the individual's perception of the statistical dependence 
between the lotteries he faces, and consequently may lead to different choices.  
 
The Two-Phase Lottery Paradox  
An individual may assign different statistical dependence matrices to two pairs of 
lotteries  p,  q and p' and q' that are characterized, respectively, by the same prize 
distributions, depending on whether the lotteries are presented as one-phase or two-phase 
lotteries (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Such an example of m(p,q) and  m(p',q') is given 
in the introduction. By Proposition 1, in our setting the individual decision-making is 
   12based on expected changes between the lotteries, and the value function Φ(x,y) can be 
such that  ≥ 0 and  ∑
X * X
xy ) y x, ( ) q , p ( m Φ ∑
X * X
xy ) y x, ( ) ' q , ' p ( m Φ < 0, which implies that  
p  ≻  q and q’  ≻  p’. If the individual perceives m(p,q) and m(p',q'), as stated in the 
introduction, then by Proposition 1, 
p ≻ q ⇔ 0.6Φ(0, 0) + 0.2Φ(0, 3000) + 0.15Φ(4000, 0) + 0.05Φ(4000, 3000) > 0,  
and 
p’ ≺ q’ ⇔ 0.75Φ(0, 0) + 0.05Φ(0, 3000) + 0.2Φ(4000, 3000) < 0. 
It is easy to verify that there are values of Φ such that these inequalities hold. For 
example, if Φ(0, 0)=0, Φ(0, 3000)= -100, Φ(4000, 0)=200, Φ(4000, 3000)=20, 
then p ≻ q (11 > 0) and  p’ ≺ q’ (-1 < 0). 
 
The Common Ratio Paradox 
Consider the following four lotteries: 
 
p = ($4000,80% ; $0,20%)  q  = ($3000,100% ) 
p' = ($4000,20% ; $0,80%)  q'  = ($3000,25% ; $0,75% ) 
 
Many individuals making a choice between p and q and between p' and q' prefer q to p 
and p’ to q’, violating the standard independence axiom I
s (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
However, in our model, such behavior is not paradoxical. The explanation of the 
observed behavior is essentially similar to that rationalizing the individual's behavior in 
the case of the Two-Phase Lotteries paradox. 
 
The Duplex Gamble Paradox 
Due to alternative modes of lottery representation or “framing”, individuals choosing 
between two probabilistically equivalent lotteries may strictly prefer one lottery to the 
other. For example, Payne & Braunstein (1971) used pairs of gambles that involve 
spinning the pointers on both “gain” and “loss wheels”, with the gambler receiving the 
resulting sums. Two such gambles, A and B, are presented below. 
   13 
 
 $40  -$40 
   Gamble A   0.6  0.5 
   0.5 
 $0  $0 
    
 $40  -$40 
Gamble B  0.5   
 0.5  0.6 
 $0  $0 
 
Although A and B have an identical underlying distribution ($40,30% ; $0,50% ; $-
40,20% ), individuals tend to choose gamble A – the one with the greater probability of 
gain. If there is greater probability of losing than winning, individuals tend to choose the 
gamble with the lower probability of loss. Once again, one can easily find combinations 
of a subjective dependence matrix m(A,B) and a value function Φ(x,y) that give rise to 




Several researchers, May (1954), Tversky (1969), and Fishburn (1970), among others, 
have collected a large body of evidence to indicate that individual behavior does not 
conform with the transitivity axiom. Due to the non-separable representation of 
preferences by the function Φ(x,y), our model is consistent with non-transitive 
preferences. An interesting example that is based on Fishburn (1987) is presented below. 
An individual is asked to make pair-wise choices between every two successive lotteries 
contained in the following table: 
   14 
 
Lottery Probability 
  1/6      1/6      1/6     1/6      1/6      1/6      
L1 100     200     300     400     500     600 
L2 200     300     400     500     600     100 
L3 300     400     500     600     100     200 
L4 400     500     600     100     200     300 
L5 500     600     100     200     300     400 
L6 600     100     200     300     400     500 
 
 
Note that lottery L2 is similar to L1 except that the payoffs are all “rotated”. Lotteries Lj+1 
and Lj , j=2,…5, are defined by a similar successive payoff rotation. Now suppose that 
the individual perceives complete statistical dependence among the columns of the table. 
In particular this means that m(L2, L1) is given by: 
  L1
   100  200  300  400  500  600  
  100        1 / 6  
  200   1/6        
L2 300    1/6       
  400     1/6       
  500      1/6     
  600       1 / 6   
 
 
And the matrices m(Lj+1, Lj), j={2,3...5}, as well as m(L6 ,L1 ) have a similar form. 
Now let Φ(x,y)=c, c≠0, when  x- y =100, (Φ(x,y)= -c when x-y = –100), and  
Φ(x,y)=tc when x- y =500 (Φ(x,y)= -tc  when x-y = –500). In such a case the expected 
value of the interchange between the lotteries Lj+1 and Lj, j={2,3,4,5}, as well as between 
the lotteries L6  and  L1 is equal to 5/6c+1/6(-tc). By Proposition 1, if 5/6c+1/6(-tc)=0, that 
is, if t = 5, then the individual is indifferent about the lotteries. If t < 5, the individual 
would reveal the cyclical choice pattern: L2 ≻ L1, L3 ≻ L2, …. , L1 ≻ L6, while if t > 5 the 
   15individual would reveal the reverse cyclical choice pattern: L1 ≻ L2, L2 ≻ L3, …. , L6 ≻ L1.  
Hence, under the assumed statistical dependence among the lotteries and the assumed 
value function, two opposite cyclical choice patterns are possible in our setting, although 
the six simple lotteries share the same underlying probability distribution.  
 
Preference Reversal 
A special case of Non-Transitive Preference examined extensively in the literature is 
“Preference Reversal”, whereby lotteries assigned lower certainty equivalents are 
subsequently preferred over those associated with higher ones (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 
1973; Grether & Plott, 1979; Tversky et al., 1990, and Loomes et al., 1989,1991). 
Preference reversals are most often observed in the “P”- “$” scenario. Individuals tend to 
choose option “P” (the high-probability low-payoff lottery) over “$” (the low- probability 
high-payoff lottery) in a pair-wise choice, however, they continue to assign a higher price 
to the “$” lottery.  
For example, consider “P”=  ($30,90%; $0,10%) and “$”=($100,30%; $0,70%). 
Individuals tend to prefer “P” over “$” although they report that “P” ~ $25 and “$” ~ $27. 
Another way of illustrating this phenomenon is by confronting individuals with a pair-
wise choice between two of the following lotteries: 
 
Lottery 40% 20% 40% 
“C” 6 6 6 
“P” 0  10  10 
“$” 0 0  15 
 
As in the former experiment, individuals tend to make cyclical choices that seem to prove 
that transitivity is violated. In fact, the behavior of some individuals seems to imply that  
(C≻P, P≻$ and $≻C) and the behavior of other individuals seems to imply the reverse 
cyclical pattern, that is, (C≺P, P≺$ and $≺C). Note that if convexity of the value 
function  Φ is assumed, models that deal with non-transitive preferences like Regret 
Theory or SSA, can account only for the first cyclical pattern. In our proposed model, 
since the individual’s behavior hinges also on his SSDM m, even if convexity of Φ is 
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can be viewed as a special case of non-transitive preferences and can therefore be 
rationalized in our model.  
 
Violations of Stochastic Dominance  
Within our proposed setting, in general, the Stochastic Dominance Condition need not be 
satisfied. Consider, for example, the situation studied by Tversky & Kahneman (1986) 
where individuals had to make a choice between the following lotteries p and q and 
between p’ and q’:  
 
p     90%  6%  1%  1%  2%  
  $0   win $45    win $45   lose $10   lose $15  
q    90%  6%  1%  1%  2%  
  $0   win $45   win $30   lose $15   lose $15  
 
' p    90%    7%  1%  2%  
  $0   win $45   lose $10   lose $15  
q'    90%  6%  1%  3%  
  $0   win $45   win $30   lose $15  
  
Lottery p stochastically dominates lottery q, and lottery p’ (q’) has the same underlying 
distribution as lottery p ( q). All the individuals preferred p to q, while 58% of the 
individuals preferred q’ (the inferior lottery) to p’.  If an individual perceives statistical 
dependence between p and q according to the columns of the table, that is, assume that 
s/he gets $0 in lottery p iff s/he receives $0 in lottery q, and so on with respect to the 
prizes corresponding to the other columns, then in our setting, by the dominance axiom, 
s/he must prefer p to q. If the individual does not perceive the same statistical dependence 
between p’ and q’ and between p and q, especially if p’ is estimated to yield a $10 loss iff 
q’ yields a $30 gain, then even if p’ dominates q’, according to the model, he or she may 
prefer q’ to p’. That is, there exist combinations of an SSDM m and a value function Φ 
that give rise to the preference of q’ over p’. 
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4. Summary and Discussion 
This paper proposes a descriptive theory of choice under risk based on  a new axiomatic 
approach to the modeling of lottery framing. In the proposed model, decision-making is 
perceived as a two-phase process. Facing a choice between two lotteries, the individual 
first forms a Subjective Statistical Dependence Matrix (SSDM) between the two lotteries 
that depends on their description and on his or her subjective perceptions. Since framing 
is an integral part of lotteries that can affect the formation of the SSDM, in this model 
lotteries characterized by the same underlying probability distribution, yet different 
framing, are considered different. In a second phase the individual chooses one of the 
lotteries by comparing pairs of statistically dependent prizes that correspond to the 
lotteries. Under four axioms regarding the individual's basic preference relation over 
SSDMs, his or her preferences over lotteries are shown to be represented by the expected 
value of the interchange between the lotteries. 
The proposed model bears some resemblance to two types of “Non-Expected 
Utility” models. One type includes models relaxing the transitivity assumption (see, for 
example, Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982,1987; Fishburn, 1982, 1984a, 1984b, 
1987, 1990; Sugden, 1993, and Nakamura, 1998) and attributing relative and not absolute 
values to prizes. That is, individuals choosing between two lotteries do not value each 
prize independently but relative to what they would have received had they chosen the 
other lottery. The main difference between these models and ours is the source of the 
statistical dependence. In Fishburn’s (1982, 1984a) SSB (skew-symmetric bilinear) 
model, the lotteries are assumed to be statistically independent. In Loomes & Sugden’s 
(1982) and Bell’s (1982) Regret Theory, as well as in Fishburn’s (1984b, 1987) SSA  
(skew-symmetric and additive) model, statistical dependence is assumed to be ‘objective’ 
and dependent on the states of the world. In our model, individuals may assume any 
subjective statistical dependence between the lotteries, which may depend on their 
description. In particular, statistical independence between the lotteries can be assumed. 
In such a case our representation result reduces to Fishburn’s result in the SSB model. 
That is, 
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X * X
) y x, ( ) y ( q ) x ( p Φ ≥ 0. 
If the value function Φ is assumed to be separable, then our model reduces to the 
standard expected utility model. That is, the representation result takes the form: 
p ≿ q  ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
− ⇔
X y X x
q(y)u(y) p(x)u(x) ≥ 0 
The other type of models (see, for example, Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992; Chateauneuf & Wakker, 1999, and Rubinstein, 1988) perceive 
decision-making as a two-phase process: an editing phase and a valuation phase. The 
difference between these models is embedded in the underlying principles of these 
phases. In Tversky (1972), Kahneman & Tversky (1979), and Tversky & Kahneman 
(1981,1986) the decision-making process hinges on the manner in which the choice 
problem is presented as well as on norms, habits and expectancies of the decision maker. 
In particular, the following principles or 'editing operations' were examined: 
Coding: perceiving lottery prices in term of gains and losses from some reference point. 
Cancellation: disregarding identical parts in the compared lotteries.  
Isolation (pseudo certainty): this special case of Cancellation means that identical parts 
in compound lotteries are disregarded while tending to prefer the compound lottery with 
the pseudo certainty prize (as in the two stage lottery paradox). 
Combination:  combining the probabilities associated with identical outcomes. For 
example, the lottery (200,25%; 200,25%; 0,50%) is reduced to (200,50%; 0,50%). 
Rounding probabilities or outcomes when convenient. 
Weighting probabilities: probabilities are transformed; the individual over-weigh small 
probabilities and under-weigh large probabilities.   
Rubinstein (1988) introduced a similarity principle claiming that when there is 
similarity between probabilities and/or prizes, the individual's choice is based on the 
probabilities/ prizes that are not similar. 
In the proposed model, in the editing phase the Subjective Statistical Dependence 
Matrix that reflects the effect of framing is formed. Not specifying how this matrix is 
related to framing implies that we can allow ample flexibility with respect to the 
relationship between the SSDM and the underlying principles or editing operations on 
which it is based. Some of the above editing operations can be conveniently presented in 
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captured by locating the corresponding joint probability on the diagonal of the SSDM. 
Similarly, Isolation (pseudo certainty) can be taken into account by locating the joint 
probability of the identical parts of two compound lotteries on the diagonal of the SSDM 
and by assuming complete statistical dependence between their non-identical parts. 
Similarity in our model can take the form of statistical dependence between similar 
probabilities/prizes. Other principles like Coding that stresses the significance of a single 
subjective reference point can also be captured by the proposed model, provided that the 
prizes in the lotteries are defined in terms of gains and losses relative to that reference 
point. However, principles like Rounding and Weighting probabilities are inconsistent 
with the proposed model; in the proposed model probabilities and prizes are undistorted.
4
                                                 
4 To emphasize the difference between the basic features of our model (in particular, the explicit account of 
how the individual perceives statistical dependence between the compared lotteries) and those of related 
models, let us consider, for example, the issue of “probabilistic insurance” introduced by Kahneman & 
Tversky (1979). “Probabilistic insurance” differs from regular insurance by adding the risk that in the event 
the hazard occurs, the insurance company does not pay the due payment with some probability α. It has 
been shown (Wakker, Thaler & Tversky, 1997), that even for very small α, people are extremely risk 
averse and, contrary to the prediction based on the standard expected utility theory, their willingness to pay 
for the probabilistic insurance is considerably reduced relative to their willingness to pay for the standard 
insurance. Segal (1988) showed that this phenomenon is consistent with rank-dependent utility models; that 
is, models (including prospect theory) that allow a weighting function of probabilities and, in particular, 
over-weighting of small probabilities. An alternative approach could be based on subjective statistical 
dependence. Suppose that the individual believes that "when it rains it pours" and, similarly, that “troubles 
come in bunches”, that is, if the house burns down, then the unfortunate event of not receiving the due 
payment from the insurance company is realized (the probably of this event is α). If complete statistical 
dependence between those two events is perceived, the value of the probabilistic insurance is equal to $0. 
In the less extreme case, where some statistical dependence between those two events is perceived, the 
probabilistic insurance is worth to the individual only a fraction of the original price he is ready to pay for 
the standard insurance policy. Although the “probabilistic insurance” phenomenon is not modeled in our 
current study (for simplicity, we assumed subjective statistical dependence between two lotteries, but not 
within the components of the lottery), we suggest that the possibility of subjective statistical dependence 
rather than distorted probabilities should be studied as the possible cause of the “probabilistic insurance” 
phenomenon. 
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is no widely accepted model resolving all the observed paradoxes (Machina, 1987; 
Loomes, 1999; Starmer, 2000). The proposed model is unique in solving such paradoxes 
in both scope and method: it is consistent with all seven paradoxes mentioned above. 
Most of the “Non-Expected Utility Models” are consistent with the paradoxes violating 
the standard independence axiom, such as the Allais Paradox. Some models are 
consistent with non-transitive preferences, while others, like “Prospect Theory”, 
rationalize behavior that takes into account various types of framing effects. None of 
these models can account for all the paradoxes on which we have focused.  
We have proposed a new approach to taking framing into account. If choice is 
affected not only by the underlying probability distributions of the possible prizes, but 
also by the description of the compared lotteries, it is very difficult and it may even be 
impossible to find a formal general definition of a lottery (simple lottery, compound 
lottery, n-tuples, etc.) that relates to all of its characteristics. In the proposed model, this 
problem is overcome by setting the Subjective Statistical Dependence Matrix as the 
primitive of the model and by defining the individual’s basic preference relation on such 
SSDMs. By adopting this approach we avoid the introduction of a formal general 
definition for "lotteries" and, in turn, the need to impose any restrictions on their nature. 
This allows the proposed model to be consistent with phenomena not explained by other 
models such as changes in preferences when decision problems are presented in different 
forms, for example, using tables, graphs, or just verbally (Moskowitz, 1974; Keller, 1985; 
Harless, 1992 and Humphrey, 2000,2001). 
One may argue that the proposed model is too flexible, allowing for "irrational" or 
"implausible" preferences, such as non-transitive preferences or allowing choice of 
stochastically-dominated lotteries. Non-transitive preferences are a well-documented 
phenomenon and various researchers claim that its existence can be rationalized within 
the scope of rational behavior (Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Fishburn, 1984, and Starmer & 
Sugden, 1998). As for stochastically-dominated choices, on one hand, if one alternative is 
perceived as stochastically dominating the other, then according to the proposed model, 
the decision-maker has to choose the dominant one. On the other hand, if he or she fails 
to recognize that an alternative is stochastically dominant, he or she may choose the 
   21inferior alternative. Such behavior can be described, at worst, as boundedly rational but 
not irrational. In any event, the proposed theory constitutes another link in the long chain 
of attempts to develop a reasonable unconventional general descriptive theory that offers 
a consistent account of observed behavior such as cyclical choice or choice of 
stochastically-dominated lotteries. 
Finally, one may argue that the proposed model is too flexible and therefore its 
explanatory and predictive strength is limited. Our response is that indeed our proposed 
basic framework requires further study, firstly, of particular statistical dependence 
patterns and their implications in terms of the individual's predicted behavior and, 
secondly, of experimental work that examines the relationship between particular forms 
of framing and such particular statistical dependence patterns (subsets of dependency 
matrices).    
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